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It is widely believed that in the United States, commercial 
banking is a declining industry. Two factors are often 
cited to support this contention. First, nonbank credit alter-
natives have grown rapidly over the last 15 years. Second, 
in the late 1980s, banks experienced record levels of fail-
ures and loan losses, symptoms of an industry in distress. 
The view that banks are declining in importance is held 
by banking executives, academics, and high officials in 
many branches of government. For example, William 
Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and now a prominent banking consultant, was 
recently quoted as saying that "the banking industry is be-
coming irrelevant economically, and it's almost irrelevant 
politically" (Bacon 1993, p. Al). Carter Golembe, the 
dean of bank consultants, similarly noted "the major prob-
lems faced by the banking industry, most notably its erod-
ing competitive position in the financial community and 
the crushing burden of regulation" (Golembe 1993, p. 4). 
The purpose of this study is to check the accuracy of 
the consensus position that banks are becoming less cen-
tral to the U.S. economy. Our conclusion, based on an 
analysis of a variety of data, is that there is no evidence of 
a significant decline in banking within the United States. 
After correcting for a number of measurement issues, we 
find that commercial banks' share of total financial inter-
mediation in this country has been roughly stable over the 
last four decades. At most, banks may have suffered a 
slight loss of market share in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. A case can be made, further, that this slight loss in 
market share was mainly a transitory response to a series 
of shocks to the banking industry that occurred over this 
period. And commercial banking has actually risen in im-
portance relative to aggregate economic activity, even over 
the last 15 years. While banks have maintained a relative-
ly constant share of intermediation, financial intermedia-
tion has been growing steadily relative to gross domestic 
product.
1 
Why should anyone care whether or not the banking 
industry is in decline? Many industries naturally expand 
or contract with the passage of time. The demise of the 
buggy whip and the hula hoop industries was hardly cause 
for great concern. Commercial banks, however, have tra-
ditionally played a central role in the financial system. 
*We received helpful comments on earlier drafts from Stan Graham, Stuart Green-
baum, Cara Lown, Preston Miller, Art Rolnick, Dave Runkle, Gary Stem, and Neil 
Wallace. We thank Kerstin Johnsson and Joel Krueger for their excellent assistance 
with statistical work. We also thank Rama Seth (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 
and Robert Yuskavage (Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis) for 
help with data analysis and interpretation. At the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, we are indebted to Jalal Aqhavein, Allen Berger, Jim Embersit, Ed 
Ettin, Myron Kwast, Tom Simpson, and David Wright. Jody Fahland provided out-
standing word processing assistance. Our special thanks go to Ed Ettin who commented 
on various drafts and provided much support for this study. Of course, we remain sole-
ly responsible for any remaining errors. 
fAlso, Adjunct Professor of Finance, University of Minnesota. 
!In fairness, we are not the only ones to have recently questioned the consensus 
view or noted the severe deficiencies of conventional bank accounting data. See, for 
example, Cates 1993 or Ettin 1994. 
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They have been key providers of liquidity. They have also 
been important conduits for credit flows to households 
and small- and medium-size businesses. (See Corrigan 
1983.) The regulatory policies (such as deposit insurance, 
discount window lending, and capital requirements) that 
make up the financial safety net stem from the premise 
that banks are critical to the flow of credit, particularly 
short-term credit. If technological change and financial 
innovation are making banks irrelevant, then, at a mini-
mum, rethinking regulatory policy is necessary. Perhaps, 
focusing the financial safety net around commercial banks 
is no longer correct. Perhaps, a safety net is no longer 
necessary. However, if excessive regulation is producing 
a decline, then relaxing some of these restrictions might 
be desirable.
2 Under either scenario, we must know the 
facts—is banking declining or not? Answering this ques-
tion is what this article is about. 
Why do our results run counter to conventional wis-
dom? Formal evidence for the traditional view comes from 
analyzing the ratio of bank assets to other forms of credit. 
There are, however, two major problems with this metric. 
One problem is that traditional measures of bank as-
sets fail to account for banks' off-balance sheet activities. 
Over the last 15 years, banks have increased the extent to 
which they do business off the balance sheet. (See Boyd 
and Gertler 1993,1994.) The combination of deregulation 
and financial innovation has permitted banks to increas-
ingly decouple the various functions involved in inter-
mediating lending. For example, banks now sell some of 
the loans they originate to other financial institutions. They 
have also increased the extent to which they indirectly 
support lending by providing backup lines of credit and 
guarantees. They now facilitate risk-sharing through the 
provision of derivative instruments. The result is that in-
dustry-share measures based on on-balance sheet assets 
understate commercial banks' contribution. We show that 
a good fraction of what appears to have been a decline in 
commercial banks' share of intermediation by traditional 
measures instead reflects a relative movement of bank ac-
tivities from on to off the balance sheet. 
The other problem with this metric involves the expan-
sion of lending by foreign commercial banks to U.S. firms 
that occurred over the 1980s. The increased foreign in-
volvement has contributed to mismeasurement of com-
mercial banks' share of domestic credit flows. The official 
measures have significantly understated the rise in loans 
supplied by foreign commercial banks (McCauley and 
Seth 1992). As we will document, after correcting for both 
the mismeasurement of foreign bank loans and the exclu-
sion of off-balance sheet activities, any evidence of a sub-
stantial decline in commercial banks' share of intermedi-
ated assets vanishes. 
It is also important to emphasize that proponents of the 
consensus view have tended to incorrectly use market 
share of intermediation numbers to draw inferences about 
banks' importance to the economy. As we implied earli-
er, market-share numbers fail to account for the relative 
growth of financial intermediation. Indeed, we find that 
even the unadjusted balance sheet measures indicate no 
decline in bank assets relative to gross domestic product. 
And our adjusted measures indicate a clear increase. 
In this paper, we first construct measures of bank assets 
that are designed to properly account for off-balance sheet 
activities and for total U.S. lending by foreign banks. We 
then analyze the behavior of this newly constructed aggre-
gate relative to other forms of credit and to gross domestic 
product. For robustness, we construct credit equivalents of 
off-balance sheet activities using two quite different meth-
ods that yield very similar results. 
To obtain further evidence on the robustness of results, 
we then present a completely different approach to mea-
suring banks' importance, using data from the national in-
come accounts (in place of balance sheet data). We use 
value-added numbers to measure banks' contribution to 
economic activity. Computations based on this approach 
give an impression that is very similar to that provided by 
the augmented balance sheet data: there is no evidence of 
a secular decline. Because of possible measurement prob-
lems with the value-added data, we also do computations 
based on input usage. Again, there is no evidence of a sec-
ular decline. 
A number of shocks have certainly jolted the banking 
industry in recent years, including increased competition, 
loan losses, and the phasing in of new regulatory require-
ments. We next assess the impact of these shocks on the 
condition of commercial banking. We conclude that these 
factors may have accounted for the slight loss in banks' 
share of intermediation over this period. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that these shocks have pushed the in-
dustry into permanent decline. Indeed, in the last two 
years or so, the fortunes of banks have steadily improved, 
along with the overall economy. Thus we cite other rea-
2Feldstein (1993), for example, makes the case that excessive regulation of banking 
may have produced harmful effects on the economy. 
3 sons to be optimistic about the future of banking and end 
with some concluding remarks. 
Before proceeding, we wish to emphasize that our mea-
sures of banking within the United States include the ac-
tivities of foreign-owned as well as domestically owned 
entities. We include these because we wish to capture all 
bank activity that occurs within U.S. borders. Thus all our 
conclusions apply to the aggregate level of banking within 
the United States and not to the breakdown of U.S. bank-
ing between foreign and domestic ownership. While there 
may not have been any significant decline in banking 
within the United States, it is true that the share of busi-
ness absorbed by foreign-owned banks increased signif-
icantly. This phenomenon, however, does not imply that 
banking has become obsolete; it implies only that the mix 
of ownership has changed. In a later section, we argue 
that the trend in ownership is likely to reverse course in 
favor of domestically owned banks and that the most re-
cently available evidence supports this conjecture. 
Adjusted Balance Sheet Measures 
Chart 1 shows the shares of (on-balance sheet) U.S. finan-
cial assets held by the different types of private financial 
intermediaries over the period 1957-93. It clearly reveals 
the source of the conventional wisdom. In 1974, bank as-
sets amounted to 45 percent of total intermediated claims. 
Since then, the bank share has steadily declined, falling to 
34 percent in 1992. Some types of intermediaries, notably 
finance companies, increased their market share dramati-
cally. However, the thrift industry (primarily savings and 
loan associations) lost more relative ground than did banks 
over this period.
3 
Chart 2 offers a different perspective. It plots the ratios 
of commercial bank assets to nominal gross domestic 
product (GDP) and of commercial bank loans to nominal 
GDP. Both ratios have increased over the last four de-
cades. The ratio of bank assets to nominal GDP rose from 
0.38 in 1957 to 0.49 in 1992, and the ratio of bank loans 
to nominal GDP rose from 0.21 to 0.33. Both ratios are 
currently about the same as they as were in 1974. Thus, 
perhaps contrary to popular thinking, the unadjusted bal-
ance sheet numbers do not indicate a decline in banking 
relative to overall economic activity since 1974; they only 
indicate a loss in market share.
4 It is important to keep 
this distinction in mind. 
The unadjusted numbers do indicate a drop-off in the 
ratio of bank loans to nominal GDP, beginning in 1986. 
However, this drop-off just offsets the rise that occurred 
in the (roughly) eight years prior. We defer a detailed 
Charts 1-2 
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Chart 1 Yes 
Share of U.S. Financial Intermediation, 1957-93 
% 
i i i i i i i 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Includes brokers, dealers, investment companies, finance companies, etc. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Chart 2 No 
Bank Assets and Loans as a Percentage 
of Nominal Gross Domestic Product, 1957-92 
% 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, U.S. Department of Commerce, and FDIC 
analysis of the recent behavior of bank loans until the 
next-to-last section. In the meantime, we simply note that 
3 In Chart 1, both state and local government pension funds are excluded from the 
insurance sector (although they are included there in the flow of funds accounts). 
4Romer and Romer (1993) similarly emphasize that the ratio of bank loans to GDP 
has not declined over the postwar period. 
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a similar sharp drop-off in the ratio of bank loans occurred 
around the time of the 1974-75 recession. In the 10 years 
following that episode, the ratio rose by nearly one-third. 
In the rest of this section, we adjust the measure of 
bank assets to account for off-balance sheet activities (us-
ing two different procedures) and for the underreporting 
of foreign loans. The adjusted series paint a different pic-
ture. Adjusted bank assets have been growing roughly in 
accord with other forms of financial intermediation over 
the last four decades. And they have been rising relative 
to national output. Our adjusted series are not free of mea-
surement problems, as we discuss. However, we offer rea-
sons to think that, if anything, these estimates are conser-
vative. 
Estimated Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
A salient feature of commercial banking over the last sev-
eral decades has been the growth and evolution of off-
balance sheet activities. Generally speaking, off-balance 
sheet activities unbundle the intermediation process. The 
key implication for our purposes is that on-balance sheet 
assets may no longer be a reliable indicator of banks' role 
in financial intermediation. 
The traditional tasks involved in intermediating a loan 
include origination (for example, screening the borrower), 
obtaining loanable funds from savers, monitoring the loan 
(which may involve holding the loan on the balance sheet), 
and asset transformation (providing savers with a security 
that may differ in risk and liquidity from the loan that the 
bank makes). There are a variety of types of off-balance 
sheet activities. Each involves segmenting off one or more 
of these intermediary functions. 
Banks, for example, may originate loans but then sell 
them to other financial institutions. Sometimes the loan is 
sold in the same form that it is originated (for example, a 
private placement). If the loan has fairly standard features 
and is well collateralized (for example, an automobile loan 
or a mortgage), then the bank may pool it in with similar 
loans and sell it as part of a securitized package. 
Another important way that banks facilitate interme-
diation without directly holding loans is by providing col-
lateral in the form of backup lines of credit or guarantees. 
A good example of this phenomenon involves the growth 
of commercial paper. Over the last 20 years, working 
capital lending to high-grade companies has shifted away 
from banks and toward the commercial paper market. 
Banks have remained in the picture, however, by provid-
ing required backup lines of credit and/or guarantees for 
most of these borrowers.
5 Simple balance sheet measures 
Chart 3 
Trends in U.S. Bank Noninterest Income 
As a Percentage of Total Income and Assets, 1961-92 
fail to capture commercial banks' key role in intermedi-
ating these funds. 
The most rapidly growing off-balance sheet activity— 
and the one that has attracted the most media attention—is 
the provision of derivative instruments. (See the box titled 
"The Role of Derivatives?" for details on how derivatives 
have affected the growth of off-balance sheet activities.) 
Provision of derivatives may be viewed as a form of asset 
transformation, one of the traditional intermediary func-
tions. A simple example is an interest rate swap, in which 
a borrower may use the bank to hedge against the interest 
rate risk it faces on a variable rate loan. Provision of de-
rivatives differs from traditional asset transformation, of 
course, in that arrangements for derivative securities take 
place off the bank's balance sheet. 
The behavior of noninterest income reflects the rising 
importance of off-balance sheet activities. Total bank in-
come can be expressed as the sum of net interest income 
(earnings from balance sheet assets net of interest costs) 
and noninterest income (noninterest earnings from off-
balance sheet activities). As Chart 3 illustrates, noninterest 
Commercial bankers have informed us that in recent years, providing guaranteed 
credit lines for highly rated commercial paper issues can be about as profitable as pro-
viding the loan directly. That is, fee income on the credit line is roughly as large as net 
interest income would be on a commercial loan of the same size. Interest rate spreads 
are generally very thin on large commercial loans to low-risk borrowers. 
5 The Role of Derivatives? 
The use of derivatives has exploded over the last few years, 
at least at a handful of large U.S. banks. Does that account 
for much of the expansion in off-balance sheet activity de-
scribed in the accompanying paper? Or has that expansion 
been broadly based? 
One type of evidence supports the latter view. Data on 
the contribution of derivatives to the Basel measures of off-
balance sheet activity are available back to 1990. In these 
years, derivatives typically account for less than 30 percent 
of the total. (See Chart 4 in the paper.) 
Another type of evidence also supports this view that ex-
pansion has been broadly based. The chart shown here plots 
the growth during 1985-92 in noninterest income across four 
different asset size classes of banks. If derivatives explain 
most of the growth in off-balance sheet activity, then we 
should expect the rise in noninterest income to be concen-
trated mainly among the 10 largest banks. (They account for 
almost all the industry's derivative activities, as can be seen 
in the accompanying table.) However, noninterest income as 
a percentage of assets has grown across all categories of 
banks. True, this ratio has grown the fastest for the 10 larg-
est banks (from 1.37 in 1985 to 2.59 in 1992). But the ratio 
has grown nearly as fast (from 1.32 to 2.25) for banks out-
side the top 10, those with assets exceeding $5 billion. 
U.S. Bank Noninterest Income 
as a Percentage of Average Assets 
By Asset Size Class,1985-92 
1986 1988 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
1990  1992 






Credit Equivalent Risk Exposure 
Total % of Assets 
Chemical Bank  $110.4  $2,114.0  $31.9  29% 
Bankers Trust Company  63.9  1,802.3  29.5  46 
Citibank  168.6  1,789.3  38.2  23 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company  103.5  1,537.5  37.9  37 
Chase Manhattan  79.9  1,026.1  23.0  29 
Bank of America  134.0  893.5  21.7  16 
First National Bank of Chicago  34.1  457.4  10.1  30 
Continental Bank  22.0  169.9  2.5  11 
Republic National Bank of New York  28.4  167.7  2.7  10 
Bank of New York  35.8  92.2  1.7  5 
"Dollar amounts in billions. 
tNotional principal positions. 
Source: Comptroller of the Currency 
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income as a percentage of bank assets was roughly stable 
from 1961 to the late 1970s. Since then, this number has 
more than doubled, going from about 0.70 percent in 
1979 to 1.87 percent in 1992. Similarly, over this period, 
noninterest income has jumped from less than 20 percent 
of total income to about 33 percent. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that noninterest income grew rapidly over the same 
time period that banks' share of total credit (in on-balance 
sheet assets) was falling. 
Our objective in this section is to adjust the measure of 
bank assets to take account of off-balance sheet activities. 
Because simple, direct measures of the value of off-bal-
ance sheet activities are unavailable, we construct two in-
direct ones. Each method has drawbacks. However, by us-
ing two very different approaches, we hope to obtain rea-
sonable, ballpark estimates. 
• Basel Credit Equivalents 
Regulators have traditionally imposed capital requirements 
only against on-balance sheet assets. However, the Basel 
Accord (of 1988) explicitly recognized the changing na-
ture of banking. It introduced the Bank for International 
Settlements' (BIS) capital standards that require banks to 
also hold capital against off-balance sheet positions that 
entail significant risk exposure. The procedure for com-
puting the off-balance sheet capital requirement entails 
converting a bank's risky off-balance sheet positions into 
credit equivalents. In effect, a credit equivalent is an esti-
mate of the amount of on-balance sheet asset holdings 
that would result in the same amount of risk exposure for 
the bank. Once the credit equivalent is computed for a 
bank, it is multiplied by a percentage capital requirement, 
just as if it were an on-balance sheet asset. 
Our first method uses this Basel credit equivalent, 
which (for our purposes) is a very useful construct. It pro-
vides a measure of off-balance sheet activities in units of 
on-balance sheet assets. Research staff at the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System provided us 
with estimates of U.S. commercial banks' total Basel cred-
it equivalents for the years 1983-91. (Unfortunately, ear-
lier estimates are unavailable.) Chart 4 expresses the esti-
mated credit equivalents as a percentage of total (on-bal-
ance sheet) bank loans. This percentage grew from about 
13 percent in 1983 to 19 percent in 1991. Thus, by 1991, 
the estimated Basel credit equivalent of off-balance sheet 
activities was approximately 20 percent of the size of 
on-balance sheet loans. The relative growth in the credit 
equivalents over this period is consistent with the relative 
growth in noninterest income portrayed in Chart 3. 
The estimated Basel credit equivalents likely understate 
off-balance sheet activities for several reasons. One is that 
they exclude certain activities. Only those off-balance 
sheet activities that are thought to result in significant risk 
exposure are included. Activities such as loan sales with-
out recourse, loan servicing, consulting, and trust depart-
ment services receive no weight whatsoever. In this vein, 
the classification scheme is somewhat arbitrary. For exam-
ple, loan commitments with a maturity of one year or 
more are subject to capital requirements. However, loan 
commitments with shorter maturities receive no capital 
weight at all and are therefore excluded from the measure 
of credit equivalents. (Not surprisingly, the banking indus-
try has responded to this regulatory policy by heavily mar-
keting 364-day loan commitments and then periodically 
rolling them over.) 
Another reason is that the estimated numbers we have 
obtained may systematically underestimate the actual Ba-
sel credit equivalents. Prior to 1990, banks did not have to 
publicly disclose all the relevant information needed to 
compute these numbers. Hence the estimates (by research-
ers at the Fed Board of Governors) need not correspond 
to the actual credit equivalents. For the years 1990 and 
1991, however, both estimated and actual numbers are 
available. If these two years are any guide, then the esti-
mates understate the actual values by at least one-third. 
The actual numbers reveal that credit equivalents for off-
balance sheet activities were roughly 30 percent of the 
size of on-balance sheet bank loans during these two 
years, instead of the estimated 20 percent. In 1993, the ac-
tual number climbed to about 33 percent.
6 
• Noninterest Income Capitalization 
Credit Equivalents 
Our second method uses the behavior of noninterest in-
come relative to net interest income to back out an esti-
mate of off-balance sheet activities. As with the con-
struction of the Basel credit equivalents, the objective is 
to obtain a measure in units of on-balance sheet assets. 
The credit equivalent of off-balance sheet activities under 
this approach is the quantity of on-balance sheet assets 
that would be required to generate the observed level of 
noninterest income. This method boils down to using the 
rate of return on on-balance sheet assets to capitalize non-
interest income. 
6Beginning in 1990, banks were required to fully report the information necessary 
to calculate Basel credit equivalents; prior to that, only estimates were possible. We are 
indebted to Jalal Aqhavein and Allen Berger for their help in obtaining these estimates. 
7 Chart 4 











While the noninterest income capitalization method is 
crude, it has several advantages over the Basel method. 
One is that since only income and balance sheet data are 
required, constructing a longer time series of credit equiv-
alents is possible. (Recall that estimates of Basel credit 
equivalents are only available back to 1983.) Another ad-
vantage is that this method constructs a credit equivalent 
for the universe of off-balance sheet activities. The Basel 
method computes credit equivalents for only those activ-
ities that regulators think will entail significant risk. The 
noninterest income capitalization method is therefore not 
susceptible to regulatory gaming by banks (to avoid capi-
tal requirements) in the same way as is the Basel method. 
For example, loan commitments for less than one year, 
which do not figure into the calculation of the Basel credit 
equivalents, are captured by the noninterest income capi-
talization method. 
We also emphasize that the capitalization method uses 
an entirely different data source than does the Basel meth-
od. The former employs bank income statements, while 
I Estimated* I Actualf I Actual Due to Derivatives** 
the latter makes use of memoranda items that are reported 
in bank call reports. Comparable results from the two 
methods would therefore be evidence of robustness. 
The algorithm for computing credit equivalents using 
the capitalization method works as follows: Define I - in-
terest income, E = interest expense, P - loan loss provi-
sion, N = noninterest expense, Y = noninterest income, 
and A = total assets. The accounting definition of profits 
before taxes, 7t, is then 
(1) n=I-E-P-N+Y! 
Let the subscript b denote on-balance sheet entries and o 
denote off-balance sheet entries, and note that Ib = I, Eh = 
E, Pb = PyYo = Y, and Ah = A, by accounting definition. 
Now, assume (counterfactually) that the noninterest 
income stream Y is being generated by some hypothetical 
assets, A0. Further assume that these assets are identical in 
all respects to actual on-balance sheet assets, including the 
mix of liabilities and equity used to finance them. The 
• i •• . •• LHHLL^HBJ •BIllLi • 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Preliminary 
'Estimated, using (historical) Federal Reserve Board of Governors' call report balance sheet data. 
tThese data were only first available in 1990. A small fraction of total credit equivalents is omitted from the reported data. 
"Basel credit equivalents due to interest rate and foreign exchange positions (with commodity and equity positions excluded). 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
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question is, How large would the hypothetical asset hold-
ings A0 have to be to generate the income stream Y? 
Since both on- and off-balance sheet assets are, by as-
sumption, equally profitable, it must be true that 
(2) (Ib-Eb-Pb-Nb)/Ab
 = (I-E-P-N0)/A0. 
Note that the variables Nb and N0 are not observable in 
published accounting statements; the only variable that is 
available is total noninterest income, N. However, because 
of the assumption of symmetry between on- and off-bal-
ance sheet assets, it must be true that 
(3) NJAb = NJA0. 
Combining equations (2) and (3) and rearranging, we get 
(4) = Ab(I-E-P0Wb-Eb-Pb). 
The denominator in (4) is net interest income minus loan 
loss provisions, and these variables all appear in account-
ing statements. I0, E0, and PQ are not separately observ-
able, but the variable Y is the net amount of income gen-
erated by off-balance sheet activities, before deducting 
noninterest expense. Therefore, 
(5) Y = I0-E0-P0. 
Substituting (5) into (4), we get 
(6) A0 = Ab[Y/(I-E-P)]. 
All the variables on the right side of (6) can be observed, 
and this is the expression used to estimate off-balance 
sheet credit equivalents, A0. 
We refer to A0 as the NIC-1 credit equivalent (for non-
interest income capitalization, method 1). Chart 5 plots the 
ratio of this credit equivalent to on-balance sheet loans, 
over the time frame 1961-93. Not surprisingly, this ratio 
closely mirrors the normalized value of noninterest in-
come portrayed in Chart 3. It is fairly flat until the mid-
1970s and then rises sharply from about 0.30 in 1978 to 
about 0.92 in 1993. 
Over the 1980s, the NIC-1 credit equivalent is also 
qualitatively similar to the behavior of the estimated Basel 
credit equivalent. (Compare Charts 4 and 5.) Not surpris-
ingly, the capitalization method yields a larger estimate 
than does the Basel method. [Recall from our earlier dis-
Chart 5 
Noninterest Income Capitalization Credit Equivalents 
as a Percentage of U.S. Bank Loans* 
1961-93 
*NIC-1 = noninterest income capitalization, method 1. NIC-2 = noninterest income capitalization, 
method 2. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and FDIC 
cussion that the latter captures only risky off-balance sheet 
activities (by regulatory definition).] 
To obtain a credit equivalent that can be more directly 
compared to the Basel credit equivalent, we make the fol-
lowing adjustment to NIC-1. We attempt to eliminate from 
NIC-1 the nonrisky off-balance sheet activities that the 
Basel numbers do not capture. We first assume (reason-
ably) that off-balance sheet activities prior to 1970 were 
primarily safe, plain-vanilla services (for example, trust 
department services). We then use the period 1961-70 to 
obtain an estimate of the ratio of the credit equivalent of 
these safe activities to on-balance sheet assets. This task 
involves taking an average of the ratio [Y/(I-E-P)] over 
this period. [See (6).] Call this ratio a. Then a A is an es-
timate of the credit equivalent of these plain-vanilla activi-
ties, if we assume that these activities remain in fairly sta-
ble proportion to balance sheet assets. (Note that over the 
period 1961-70, the ratio a was reasonably stable.) Final-
ly, to obtain a credit equivalent that is adjusted to capture 
only risky activities, we subtract a A from A0 in (6). Call 
the adjusted number A(adj). Thus 
(7) A(adj) = A0 - aA = [Y/(I-E-P) - a]A. 
For consistency, we refer to A(adj) as the NIC-2 credit 
9 equivalent (for noninterest income capitalization, method 
2). Chart 5 also plots the NIC-2 credit equivalent as a 
fraction of on-balance sheet loans.
7 
Underreported Offshore Foreign Loans 
It is no secret that over the last decade, foreign banks have 
significantly increased their operations within the United 
States. Until very recently, however, few observers fully 
appreciated the magnitude of foreign bank intermediation. 
A study by McCauley and Seth (1992) showed that the 
official numbers greatly understated foreign involvement. 
In particular, there has been minimal accounting for loans 
by foreign banks that were booked offshore. For a number 
of years, U.S. offices of foreign banks could avoid all 
U.S. reserve requirements if they booked loans outside the 
United States at their home offices or in tax havens. Un-
fortunately, the official U.S. statistical sources, including 
the flow of funds accounts, did not capture such offshore 
bookings.
8 
McCauley and Seth obtained data from the U.S. Trea-
sury that avoid this measurement problem. The Treasury 
collects data from U.S. borrowers, not from banks. There-
fore, its numbers include the offshore bookings. Chart 6 
shows that the discrepancy between the actual and the of-
ficially measured quantity of foreign bank loans was quite 
large. And the discrepancy grew over the last decade. In 
1983, the unadjusted share of bank assets held by foreign 
banks was about 5 percent, while the adjusted share 
(which took account of offshore loans) was 9 percent. In 
1992, the unadjusted share was 11 percent, while the ad-
justed share jumped to 21 percent. By 1993, unreported 
offshore commercial loans totaled $175 billion. (See Table 
A1 in the Appendix.) 
Since the offshore foreign loans reflect loans to U.S. 
firms that are intermediated by commercial banks, they 
should be added to our adjusted measure of bank credit. 
Here our goal is to measure the importance of commercial 
banks to the U.S. economy. The rise in the foreign share 
over the 1980s may have reflected increased competition 
for domestic banks, but it did not in any way reflect a 
decline in the role of banking. 
How the bank credit flows are divided between foreign 
and domestic entities is an interesting issue, but one that 
is beyond our focus. We do, however, conjecture that for 
several reasons, the foreign share of banking is likely to 
decline.
9 One reason is that a number of the regulatory 
differences that favored foreign banks have been eliminat-
ed (for example, differential reserve requirements and cap-
Chart 6 
Percentage of U.S. Bank Assets Held by Offices 
of Foreign Banks Located in the United States 
1983-93 
'Adjusted for underreported offshore loans. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
ital requirements). Another reason is that the U.S. trade 
deficit, which, no doubt, accounted for some of the rise in 
the share of foreign lending during the 1980s, appears to 
be reversing course. 
Adjusted Measures of Total Bank Assets 
We now present measures of total bank assets that adjust 
for both off-balance sheet activities and unreported off-
shore loans. We construct two aggregates: one that uses 
the Basel estimates to generate credit equivalents for off-
balance sheet assets and another that uses the noninterest 
income capitalization method. We then use the adjusted 
aggregates to recompute the following: (i) banks' share of 
total intermediated assets and (ii) the magnitude of bank 
credit relative to GDP. 
Chart 7 plots the adjusted share of commercial bank 
assets in total financial intermediation, relative to the un-
adjusted share. In this chart, we use the NIC-2 credit 
equivalent to illustrate the effect of the capitalization meth-
7The adjustment to total bank assets is not greatly affected if the base period 
(1961-70) for computing a is moved forward or backward a few years. 
8 Recently, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began collecting 
and publishing comparable data. See Terrell 1993. 
9In fact, Nolle (1994) presents evidence that foreign banks' share has already 
begun to decline. 
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od, since this aggregate corresponds best to the Basel 
credit equivalent. (Recall that NIC-2 is a rough attempt to 
isolate risky off-balance sheet activities.) The two meth-
ods yield similar results—though, as expected, the NIC-2 
method produces a larger change than does the Basel 
method. The Basel method eliminates about one-half of 
the decline in bank share that occurred since the peak in 
1974, and the NIC-2 method eliminates nearly all of it. 
And viewed from the context of the entire four decades, 
the decline in the bank share since the peak in 1974 is 
quite modest. The average bank share over this period is 
fairly stable, averaging slightly greater than 40 percent. 
We also compare the relative importance of correcting 
for off-balance sheet activities versus correcting for off-
shore foreign lending. (See Table A2 in the Appendix.) 
Each correction accounts for about one-half of the devi-
ation of the adjusted bank share number from the unad-
justed number in Chart 7 when the Basel method is em-
ployed. With the NIC-2 method, the off-balance sheet 
correction accounts for about two-thirds of the difference, 
and the foreign lending correction explains the remaining 
one-third. 
Chart 8 repeats the exercise portrayed in Chart 7, this 
time normalizing the adjusted measures of bank assets rel-
ative to GDP. While the unadjusted ratio flattens out after 
1975, the two adjusted ratios continue to rise. Thus, rel-
ative to GDP, commercial banking appears to have in-
creased in importance. As in the previous case, using ei-
ther the Basel or the NIC-2 credit equivalent to account 
for off-balance sheet activities appears to generate similar 
results; however, the NIC-2 method produces a somewhat 
larger change. 
We also plot the ratios of adjusted bank assets to total 
intermediary assets and adjusted bank assets to nominal 
GDP. Here we use the NIC-1 credit equivalent, which is 
the comprehensive measure of off-balance sheet activities. 
(See Charts A1 and A2 in the Appendix.) This time we 
do not include the Basel-adjusted ratios in the charts, since 
the Basel credit equivalent does not correspond closely to 
the NIC-1 credit equivalent. From roughly 1961 to 1978, 
the adjusted series for each ratio is simply an upward, par-
allel shift of the unadjusted series. After about 1978, the 




We readily acknowledge that our adjustments to the 
flow of funds balance sheet data are crude. Nonetheless, 
it is reassuring that two very different approaches to ac-
counting for off-balance sheet activities yield rather simi-
Charts 7-8 
Adjusted vs. Unadjusted Measures of U.S. Bank Assets* 
Chart 7 As a Percentage of Financial Intermediary Assets 
1955-93 
Sources: FDIC, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Chart 8 As a Percentage of Nominal Gross Domestic Product 
1957-92 
% 
i i i i i i i 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and U.S. Department of Commerce 
"Adjusted series include underreported offshore loans (1983-91), as well as off-balance sheet 
credit equivalents. 
fNIC-2 = noninterest income capitalization, method 2. 
10In some computations (not reproduced here), NIC-adjusted bank assets were re-
duced by the amount of their holdings of U.S. government securities and agency issues. 
Banks' share of financial intermediation and bank assets divided by GDP still displayed 
almost exactly the same patterns as in Charts A1 and A2. Of course, there is a down-
ward, level shift due to the reduction in adjusted total bank assets. 
11 lar results. Our numbers may be biased, however, in that 
we have not been able to take account of off-balance 
sheet activities of other financial intermediaries due to a 
lack of data availability. Insurance companies, in particu-
lar, have been active in issuing letters of credit and other 
financial and performance guarantees. Thus our adjusted 
numbers may overstate banks' share of intermediated asset 
holdings. This consideration, however, does not affect our 
rough measure of banks' importance to the overall econ-
omy, that is, the ratio of bank assets to GDP. We also em-
phasize that both the Basel and the NIC-2 credit equiva-
lents used in the calculations underlying Charts 7 and 8 
account for only a subset of banks' off-balance sheet ac-
tivities. Only the NIC-1 credit equivalents that we used 
are, in principle, comprehensive. (Again, see Charts A1 
and A2 in the Appendix.) 
In the next section, we pursue an entirely different ap-
proach to measuring the importance of banking using data 





Our goal in this section is to measure the economic out-
put—or value-added—of commercial banks, using infor-
mation from the national income accounts. 
The national income accounts provide information on 
the value-added of different sectors of the economy, in-
cluding the financial sector. The series began in 1947. The 
finance sector data include separate information for depos-
itory institutions, insurance companies, brokers, and other 
credit intermediaries. At present, these subsector value-
added data are only available through 1990. 
Because a total sales figure is unavailable for financial 
intermediaries, one cannot compute their value-added us-
ing standard methods. Instead, value-added for this sector 
is represented by the sum of payments to all factors of 
production, which are composed primarily of wages and 
salaries, profits, interest expense, and depreciation.
1
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We emphasize that the value-added approach to mea-
surement is quite different from the balance sheet ap-
proach we employed in the previous section. Not only are 
the data sources different, but so is the underlying concep-
tual basis. Indeed, the value-added approach is, in princi-
ple, the purest way to identify banks' contribution. Unlike 
the balance sheet approach, it naturally adjusts for changes 
in the nature of bank activities. For example, a dollar's 
worth of bank employee labor is treated the same, whether 
it is paid to a teller or to a swap trader. Therefore, the 
value-added measure will capture all off-balance sheet 
activities of banks and other financial intermediaries (thus 
eliminating one important potential source of bias in our 
previous analysis). Moreover, the value-added measure 
should capture changes in the composition of on-balance 
sheet assets for banks and other intermediaries. For com-
mercial banks, the trend has been to move out of lower-
risk lending into higher-risk, information-intensive lend-
ing. (For examples of this trend, see Boyd and Gertler 
1993, 1994.) Value-added per dollar of assets is likely 
higher for the latter activity than for the former. 
Unfortunately, the national income accounts do not 
maintain sectoral data for commercial banks by them-
selves. What are called banks in these accounts (and in 
our Charts 9-14) include commercial banks, Federal Re-
serve banks, and mutual savings banks. And these data are 
only available through 1987. After that date, changes in 
standard industrial classifications were made. Therefore, 
to obtain a banking industry series that is historically con-
sistent and goes beyond 1987, we must examine an even 
more inclusive aggregate. We call this aggregate banks+ 
credit. It includes banks as defined above plus savings and 
loans, credit unions, business credit institutions, mortgage 
banks, and rediscounting agencies (such as the Federal 




Chart 9 shows the value added by the banking indus-
try, expressed as a percentage of the total value added by 
the financial intermediary sector. Both banking industry 
definitions are shown in the chart, and both are highly 
correlated. The main thing to observe from Chart 9 is that 
over the long run, banks' share of value-added has re-
mained fairly constant, if anything, increasing somewhat 
over time. Linear time trends fitted through both series 
display positive slopes. 
1
1
 For completeness, we note here several other types of bank-related assets that 
do not appear on conventional bank balance sheets. One is assets held by nonbank affil-
iates of bank holding companies (for example, consumer finance affiliates). As shown 
in Table A3 in the Appendix, these amounted to $268 billion by 1993 (with roughly 
one-half in the form of securities). Another is loans originated by commercial banks 
and sold or participated without recourse into the secondary market. In 1993, about 
$83 billion in consumer loans and (at least) $53 billion in commercial loans had been 
sold in this manner. These data on sold loans must be interpreted with extreme caution, 
however. A significant (but unknown) fraction of such loan sales are to other commer-
cial banks. Moreover, data on sales of mortgage loans by commercial banks—un-
doubtedly a large volume activity—are not currently available. 
12This method for computing value-added is also employed for many service sec-
tors of the economy. 
1
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 We thank Robert Yuskgavage for explaining these features of the data to us. 
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Charts 9-11 
U.S. Banks vs. All U.S. Financial Intermediariest 
With Linear Time Trends 
Chart 9 The Value That Banks Add to Gross Domestic Product 
As a Percentage of the Value Added 
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Chart 11 Real Capital of Banks as a Percentage of Real Capital 
of Financial Intermediaries 
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Wanks includes commercial banks, Federal Reserve banks, and mutual savings banks. Banks + 
Credit includes banks as just defined plus savings and loans, credit unions, business credit 
institutions, mortgage banks, and rediscounting agencies (such as FNMA and GNMA). 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
There is a long-standing controversy about national in-
come accounting for financial intermediaries and about the 




 In light of the continuing debate, it is useful to 
Chart 10 Employment in Banking as a Percentage of Employment 
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Banks 0.16% per year 
20-
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'Includes full- and part-time equivalents. 
1980  1990 
investigate trends in factor inputs of firms in these indus-
tries as well as their output. Factor inputs for financial in-
termediaries are measured in the usual way and are not 
particularly subject to error relative to other industries. 
Chart 10 shows banks' share of total employment (with 
full- and part-time equivalents) as a percentage of total 
employment in financial intermediary firms. The long-
term trend in banks' share of employment displays a posi-
tive slope, according to either measure. However, it ap-
pears to have made a modest drop in the 1980s. For ex-
ample, the share of banks+credit dropped from just over 
50 percent in 1983 to about 47 percent in 1992. 
Chart 11 shows banks' share of total investment in 
plant and equipment as a percentage of total plant and 
equipment investment in the financial intermediary sector. 
These numbers are net of depreciation and are adjusted for 
the effects of inflation. The picture here is very much like 
that for employment (in Chart 10). That is, the long-run 
trend is positive, according to either measure. However, in 
the early 1980s, both measures fall below trend. It is 
See, for example, Berger and Humphrey 1992 or Fixler and Zieschang 1992. 
13 Charts 12-14 
The U.S. Financial Intermediary Sectort 
Chart 12 Value Added to Gross Domestic Product 
as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
1947-90 
Chart 14 Sector Real Capital as a Percentage 
of Total U.S. Real Capital 
Net Plant and Equipment, 1947-92 
Wanks includes commercial banks, Federal Reserve banks, and mutual savings banks. Banks + 
Credit includes banks as just defined plus savings and loans, credit unions, business credit 
institutions, mortgage banks, and rediscounting agencies (such as FNMA and GNMA). 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 
worth noting that the input-share measures for banks drop 
around 1980, whereas their share of value-added is actual-
ly above trend in the 1980s. We are not sure of the expla-
nation for the difference between recent trends in industry 
inputs and outputs. What is clear, however, is that, accord-
Chart 13 Employment as a Percentage 
of Total U.S. Employment* 
1947-92 
Includes full- and part-time equivalents. 
ing to any of these measures, there is no evidence that 
commercial banking has lost market share over the long 
run. All six fitted time trends in Charts 9-11 display posi-
tive slopes. 
As with the balance sheet data, if we scale banks' im-
portance relative to the national economy instead of to 
other intermediaries, the picture is even brighter. Consider 
the growth of the financial intermediary sector relative to 
the total economy, as in Chart 12. The chart shows the 
value added by the financial intermediary sector as a per-
centage of total GDP. This percentage has increased sub-
stantially over the sample period, in fact, more than dou-
bling. However, the same is true for either measure of 
banks' share of the value added to total GDP. As shown 
in Charts 13 and 14, the same result (much more rapid 
growth than the overall economy) is displayed by the fac-
tors of production of the intermediary sector and of bank-
related firms. The growth in capital investment has been 
particularly dramatic. These data, therefore, consistently 
suggest that the financial intermediary sector, including 
banks, has been a growth industry, relative to the overall 
economy. 
Implications of the Recent 
Bank Lending Slowdown 
Both the adjusted balance sheet data and the national in-
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come accounts data suggest that, at most, there has been 
a slight decline in commercial banks' share of financial 
intermediation over the last decade. And, if anything, 
banking as a component of GDP has risen in importance. 
Nonetheless, from 1986 to 1992, there was a fairly sub-
stantial drop in the growth rate of (on-balance sheet) com-
mercial bank lending. The measurement issues that we 
emphasized in the adjusted balance sheet section account 
for part of this phenomenon. We think the other part may 
be explained largely by factors that were transitory in na-
ture. There is no clear reason to believe that it is symp-
tomatic of a major decline in banking. 
Chart 15 plots the growth rates of real bank loans, 
bank assets, and total financial intermediary assets over 
the period 1957-92. From 1986 on, the growth rate of 
bank loans steadily declines, becoming negative in 1990. 
Most of the decline is due to a drop in commercial and 
industrial lending. (See Boyd and Gertler 1993, 1994.) 
However, the commercial paper market, which grew rap-
idly over this period, absorbed some of this decline. As 
we have argued earlier, this phenomenon, for the most 
part, reflects a shift of high-quality commercial and indus-
trial (C&I) lending from on to off the banks' balance 
sheets, since banks typically provide continued support 
with backup credit lines and guarantees. Offshore foreign 
banks absorbed another portion of the decline. Here, of 
course, the problem is the failure to include the assets of 
foreign offshore banks in the measure of the aggregate 
C&I lending. 
Beyond these measurement issues, however, we think 
that underlying the 1986-92 slowdown in bank lending 
were at least two other factors that were largely transitory 
in nature. One involves the recent capital shortage, which 
(according to numerous authors) was a significant factor 
in the lending slowdown. The other involves the 1990-91 
recession and the associated drop in long-term interest 
rates. We analyze each in turn. 
The Capital Crunch 
In the 1980s, several factors combined to produce (what 
many observers claim was) a capital shortage (or a capital 
crunch) within the banking industry. The first was a series 
of adverse shocks to bank loan portfolios that substantially 
depleted bank capital by producing record loan losses for 
the postwar period. These shocks included the less-devel-
oped country (LDC) debt crisis and the collapse of profits 
in agriculture, oil, and real estate. The second factor was 
the associated tightening of regulatory standards. In re-
Chart 15 
Growth Rates in U.S. Real Financial Assets 
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sponse to the deteriorating condition of depository institu-
tions, regulators tightened supervision and imposed new 
restrictions. Included among the new restrictions was the 
Basel Accord (and its new BIS capital standards). 
The pressure on capital was particularly acute for large 
banks. (See Boyd and Gertler 1993, 1994.) These banks 
suffered disproportionate losses of capital since they had 
invested heavily in both LDC and commercial real estate 
lending. Further, even before loan losses piled up, large 
banks tended to operate with capital/asset ratios that were 
well below the industry mean. The huge loan losses over 
the 1980s simply pushed them further below the mean. 
Therefore, in the peak years of the capital crunch (1989-
91), large banks had to make the greatest effort to satisfy 
the newly instituted capital standards. 
The significance of the capital crunch for our purposes 
is that it was a likely factor in the bank lending slow-
down. An enormous volume of recent research, beginning 
with the work of Bernanke and Lown (1991), Furlong 
(1991), Johnson (1991), and Peek and Rosengren (1991), 
has identified a connection between bank capital and lend-
ing over this period. These papers use panel data on indi-
vidual banks to estimate loan supply equations that allow 
for the influence of capital. While there has been debate 
over the influence of regulatory factors, the link between 
capital and lending has been found to be fairly robust. 
Further, this link survives after controlling for variation in 
15 loan demand across banks. Finally, Lown and Peristiani 
(1993) have recently shown that it was mainly among 
large banks that capital impinged on lending (that is, the 
link between capital and lending was strongest among 
large banks). This finding is compatible with the earlier 
evidence that the capital shortage was likely most acute 
for large banks. 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to add to 
the formal evidence on this topic, we do think that it is 
useful to show the link between capital and asset growth 
that is present in the raw data. As shown in Table 1, un-
dercapitalized banks contracted their assets in each year 
from 1990 through 1992 and increased them in 1993 at 
only about a 1 percent rate. Well-capitalized banks, how-
ever, exhibited positive rates of asset growth in each of 
these years, averaging about 5.7 percent. 
It is, of course, important to distinguish between the 
behavior of assets and the behavior of loans. Table 1 
shows that for the period 1990-93 the differences in loan 
growth across undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks 
were roughly the same as the differences in asset growth. 
In 1991 and 1992, loan growth was below asset growth 
for all categories, though it was weakest at undercapital-
ized banks and strongest at well-capitalized banks. Inter-
estingly, in 1993, loan growth picked up substantially for 
well-capitalized banks, but remained stagnant for the other 
categories. 
Table 2 reports the connection between size and real 
asset growth, in the spirit of Lown and Peristiani (1993). 
(Unfortunately our data disaggregated by size do not per-
fectly overlap with our data disaggregated by capital ade-
quacy.) The largest banks grew much less rapidly over the 
1984—91 period than did the rest of the industry. The av-
erage growth rate of balance sheet assets of banks in the 
over $10 billion category was only 0.7 percent, whereas 
the industry average growth rate was 4.3 percent. To the 
extent that large banks were, on average, further below 
regulatory capital limits, we should expect (with every-
thing else being equal) the decline in loan growth to be 
greatest among these banks. This is, of course, exactly 
what Lown and Peristiani found.
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In summary, there is evidence to suggest that (beyond 
the measurement problems discussed in the adjusted bal-
ance sheet section) the unusual slowdown in bank lending 
was due, in part, to balance sheet problems experienced 
primarily by large banks. Much of the adjustment to the 
capital shortage, however, appears to have taken place. 
Capital/asset ratios within the industry have improved, 
partly due to adjustment in assets and partly due to the re-
plenishment of capital. Several years of strong earnings 
and a favorable equity market are responsible for the latter. 
The 1990-91 Recession 
Another key factor underlying the lending slowdown was 
the 1990-91 recession. Over 1983-91, (unadjusted) real 
bank assets grew at a uniformly lower rate than did total 
intermediary assets, as Chart 15 illustrates. However, in 
the period around the recession, the growth rate of total 
real financial intermediary assets declined at about the 
same rate as the growth rate of (unadjusted) real commer-
cial bank assets. This across-the-board decline suggests 
that falling demand for intermediary loans around this 
time was partly responsible for the behavior of bank lend-
ing. As Chart 15 illustrates, a similar sharp drop in the 
growth rate of bank assets and bank loans occurred 
around the 1974-75 recession. The growth rate of total in-
termediary assets also fell, suggesting that demand factors 
were again at work. 
We also emphasize that the growth rates of bank loans 
and bank assets in Chart 15 are not adjusted for the mea-
surement issues raised in the adjusted balance sheet sec-
tion. Though we do not show the results here, simply add-
ing in corrections for omitted offshore foreign loans and 
off-balance sheet activities raises the growth rate of bank 
loans and bank assets by several percentage points over 
the years from 1987 to 1990. 
Finally, we ask, Why did bank lending not pick up in 
1992 and 1993? Is this not evidence that there has been a 
fundamental change and that commercial banking is in 
decline? We think not. There have been similar episodes 
(for example, flat or falling loan demand in a recovering 
economy) in the past. Rising cash flows associated with 
the recovery add to the supply of internal funds, dampen-
ing the need for external finance. For example, bank loans 
fell precipitously in 1976, the first year of the recovery af-
ter the 1974-75 recession. In addition, as we have been 
suggesting, stagnant lending has not been unique to com-
mercial banks. Table A4 in the Appendix shows that total 
business lending by nonbank finance companies has been 
essentially flat since 1991. 
There may be several other factors involved that are 
peculiar to this recovery. One factor is that some loan 
markets remain depressed. This trend is particularly true 
1
5
 For more information on the relation between size and performance in banking, 
also see Boyd and Runkle 1993. 
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Tables 1-2 
Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates 
Table 1 U.S. Bank Assets and Loans by Capital Adequacy Class* 
Well- Adequately Under- All 
Capitalized! Capitalized! Capitalized! Banks 
Year  Assets  Loans  Assets  Loans  Assets  Loans  Assets  Loans 
1990  6.95  6.72  3.62  3.90  -2.24  -2.46  2.62  2.38 
1991  5.79  2.37  1.54  -2.75  -4.85  -8.53  1.05  -2.86 
1992  3.48  .88  1.66  -1.65  -5.12  -9.09  2.63  -1.24 
1993  6.76  7.50  2.90  .19  1.25  .40  5.39  5.40 
Outstanding 
Balances at 
End of 1993 
($ Bil.) 
3,016  1,724  433  263  236  153  3,691  2,140 
'Domestically chartered banks, consolidated foreign and domestic operations. 
tAdjusted for CAMEL (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity) ratings. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Table 2 U.S. Bank Real Assets by Asset Size Class* 
Beginning Real Asset Size Class 
$0- $50 Mil.—  $100 Mil- $250 Mil —  $1 Bil-
UVGI vP IU UN. 
All 
Year  50 Mil.  100 Mil.  250 Mil.  1 Bil.  10 Bil.  Unadjusted  Adjusted!  Banks 
1984  6.2  4.5  4.9  6.1  9.3  -2.0  2.2  5.8 
1985  5.7  3.6  4.7  6.9  9.9  2.2  3.4  5.4 
1986  6.6  5.3  6.8  7.8  11.0  7.1  6.9  6.6 
1987  2.6  .9  1.1  2.1  3.0  1.3  1.9  2.0 
1988  3.8  3.8  4.9  5.3  6.3  -.6  .5  4.0 
1989  3.0  2.9  2.8  4.4  3.8  2.0  2.6  3.0 
1990  5.4  3.4  3.1  3.8  2.7  -2.2  .6  4.5 
1991  3.7  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.5  -2.1  -3.3  2.9 
Mean  4.6  3.3  3.8  4.8  5.9  .7  1.9  4.3 
Avg. No. 
of Firms  6,948  2,380  1,461  607  270  33  33  11,700 
'Deflated by implicit gross domestic product deflator, 
flncludes Basel credit equivalents. 
Source: Comptroller of the Currency 
17 of commercial real estate lending, and the problem is 
much worse in some parts of the country than in others. 
In the first nine months of 1993, business loans expanded 
in the Southeast, Midwest, and Southwest, but contracted 
in the Northeast and Far West (especially California). (The 
latter two areas were the hardest hit by the commercial 
real estate crash.) Moreover, most of the contraction in 
bank business lending has been in construction and land 
development loans (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 1993). Whereas delinquency and charge-
off rates have fallen since mid-1991, these still remain 
high by historical standards in some parts of the country. 
In response to these conditions, many bank managers 
have remained cautious about expanding loan portfolios, 
even as the economy has recovered. The Federal Re-
serve's survey of terms of bank lending indicates that 
banks have gradually eased credit terms for large corpo-
rate borrowers, but have not done so for smaller corpora-
tions. Indeed, the spread of the prime rate over the federal 
funds rate remains around 300 basis points, which is ex-
tremely high by historic standards. 
Another factor is that banks have not needed to expand 
their loan portfolios to earn exceptional profits. (See Table 
A5 in the Appendix.) Over the last several years, the yield 
curve has been very steeply sloped, and banks have been 
able to earn excellent interest rate spreads on expanded 
holdings of government- and mortgage-backed securities. 
Table A6 in the Appendix shows the growth in the ratio 
of securities to total assets. Various observers have noted 
the unusual nature of these circumstances and the potential 
for interest rate risk exposure. 
Still another factor is that for the last several years, low 
long-term interest rates and an associated favorable equity 
market may have induced substitution away from bank 
loans. That is, nonfinancial corporations have reduced their 
dependence on short-term borrowing by issuing long-term 
debt and new equity. Over the period 1990-93, the frac-
tion of total borrowing obtained by nonfinancial corpora-
tions from commercial banks fell by just over 2 percent-
age points. (See Table A4 in the Appendix.) Similarly, 
nonbank loans fell by 2.4 percentage points. However, 
these declines were offset by bonds outstanding, which in-





We do not dispute the notion that the banking industry ex-
perienced severe difficulties in the late 1980s. Indeed, our 
earlier work (Boyd and Gertler 1993, 1994) focused on 
this issue. What we are calling into question is whether 
the poor performance over this period signals the begin-
ning of a permanent decline. Both the balance sheet data 
(adjusted for a variety of measurement issues) and value-
added and input data from the national income accounts 
fail to reveal any striking decline in the role of commer-
cial banks. 
Clearly, banks have faced increased competition from 
nonbank alternatives. They have responded, however, by 




 The rising importance of off-
balance sheet activities, ranging from credit lines to deriv-
ative products, are symptomatic of these developments. 
In many cases, further, the growth of off-balance sheet 
activities reflects only superficial rather than substantive 
changes in the nature of banking. For example, the inter-
mediation aspect of providing backup credit lines or guar-
antees to commercial paper issuers is not fundamentally 
different from that of directly providing credit to these 
high-grade companies. Thus we strongly caution against 
interpreting movement to off-balance sheet activities as in-
dicating that banks are moving into completely new lines 
of business and abandoning old ones. 
If we are right that banking is not a declining industry, 
then more than an academic interest is at stake. Impor-
tant public policy decisions have been and continue to be 
based on the consensus view. One such policy is in the 
area of bank mergers. Consolidation in banking (largely 
via mergers) has been encouraged, partly on the grounds 
that it is a way to mobilize resources out of a declining 
industry. If the industry is not declining, only changing, 
this argument loses force. Another such policy area is the 
expansion of bank powers. One common argument is that 
banks are declining because, with current power limita-
tions, they cannot compete. This argument also loses force 
(although there may be other perfectly valid reasons why 
bank powers should be expanded). Along the same lines, 
it is often argued that banks cannot compete because of 
excessive regulatory burden or that interest should be paid 
16Very recently released data from the Federal Reserve's survey of terms of bank 
lending suggest a sharp pickup in bank lending, including commercial lending, in many 
parts of the country. 
17In Boyd and Gertler 1993, we summarize the arguments that explain why bank-
ing continues to occupy a special niche in the financial services industry. After taking 
into account its (important) indirect role in the commercial paper market, we find that 
banking remains central to the provision of liquidity. For similar arguments, see Corri-
gan 1983 and D'Arista and Schlesinger 1992. 
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on required reserves to help out this troubled industry. Re-
lated policy proposals abound, all based on a premise that 
is questionable. If public policy is based on bad assump-
tions, it is not likely to be good, except by accident. Appendix 
Supplemental Measures of Bank Growth 
This appendix contains material that is helpful for a more de-
tailed understanding of the preceding paper. The tables and 
charts are listed in the order in which they are referred to in the 
text. 
Table A1 
Foreign Bank Share of U.S. Commercial and Industrial Loan Market* 
1992  1993 
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  Q1  Q2  03  04  01 
C&l Loans to U.S. Addressees  467  512  556  623  654  712  765  804  777  776  774  771  743  741 
U.S.-Owned Bank Loans  381  402  419  454  445  464  481  477  428  432  415  408  380  379 
Onshore  364  382  401  439  431  446  460  454  407  411  393  386  360  359 
Offshore  17  20  18  15  15  18  21  22  22  21  22  22  21  20 
Foreign-Owned Bank Loansf  86  110  137  169  209  248  284  327  348  344  359  363  363  363 
Branches and Agencies  34  43  53  68  86  103  116  127  146  145  145  144  148  142 
Subsidiaries  32  35  39  41  44  50  52  52  50  40  49  49  45  46 
Estimated Offshore**  20  31  45  60  79  95  116  148  152  160  164  171  170  175 
Offshore Claims by Foreign Banks on U.S. Nonbanks  31  49  74  98  130  157  192  246  252  264  272  282  281  289 
BIS Reporting Banks' Claims on U.S. Nonbanks  52  71  93  115  146  181  217  272  278  289  298  307  306  314 
Claims on U.S. Nonbanks by Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks  21  22  19  17  16  24  25  26  26  25  26  25  25  25 
Offshore Loans by Branches, Agencies, and Subsidiaries  1  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Memo: Foreign Share (%)  18  21  25  27  32  35  37  41  45  44  46  47  49  49 
Branches and Agencies  7  8  10  11  13  14  15  16  19  19  19  19  20  19 
Subsidiaries  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  6  6  5  6  6  6  6 
Offshore  4  6  8  10  12  13  15  18  20  21  21  22  23  24 
'Dollar amounts are in billions (except as noted). Banks in the United States include all banking institutions that file Reports of Condition with the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examinations Council. 
flncludes branches, agencies, and subsidiaries. 
"These figures are estimated in two steps. We calculate the commercial and industrial proportion of total claims on nonbanks of branches and agencies of foreign banks 
in the United States. Then, assuming that the offshore proportion is the same, we apply this fraction, 60 percent, to the offshore claims by foreign 
banks on U.S. nonbanks. Note that the Q11991 Bahamian and Q1 and Q2 Cayman Islands' figures for lending are carried over from the end of 1990. 
Source: Dr. Rama Seth, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
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Table A2 
Comparing the Measures 
Correcting for Off—Balance Sheet Activities vs. Correcting for Offshore Foreign Lending* 
Adjusted for 
Off-Balance Sheet Activities 
Underreporting of 
Year  Unadjusted  Basel Methodt  NIC-2 Method**  Offshore Loai 
1971  506.5  530.3 
(4.7) 
1972  575.7  —  606.9  — 
(5.4) 
1973  662.4  —  697.0  — 
(5.2) 
1974  737.5  —  782.2  — 
(61) 
1975  768.8  —  868.4  — 
(13.0) 
1976  833.2  —  853.7  — 
(2.5) 
1977  924.6  —  930.3  — 
(-6) 
1978  1,052.6  —  1,057.7  — 
(•5) 
1979  1,181.8  —  1,195.4  — 
(1.1) 
1980  1,289.9  —  1,350.8  — 
(4.7) 
1981  1,398.2  —  1,512.3  — 
(8.2) 
1982  1,482.9  —  1,637.3  — 
(10.4) 
1983  1,626.1  1,797.2  1,857.8  1,682.6 
(10.5)  (14.2)  (3.5) 
1984  1,800.1  2,036.5  2,094.3  1,883.8 
(13-1)  (16.3)  (4.6) 
1985  1,989.5  2,260.5  2,377.5  2,100.7 
(13.6)  (19.5)  (5.6) 
1986  2,187.6  2,479.1  2,762.8  2,317.3 
(13.3)  (26.3)  (5.9) 
1987  2,323.0  2,630.0  3,335.1  2,485.1 
(13-2)  (43.6)  (7.0) 
1988  2,479.5  2,807.6  3,147.3  2,677.2 
(13.2)  (26.9)  (8-0) 
1989  2,647.4  3,003.5  3,699.3  2,878.4 
(13.5)  (39.7)  (8.7) 
1990  2,772.5  3,201.4  3,959.2  3,046.7 
(15.5)  (42.8)  (9.9) 
1991  2,856.8  3,251.8  4,148.8  3,117.6 
(13.8)  (45.2)  (9.1) 
1992  2,951.6  —  4,075.2  3,222.8 
(38.1)  (9-2) 
'Dollar amounts are in billions. Entries in parentheses represent the percentage increase in banking industry assets due to adjustment. 
tEstimated Basel credit equivalents are added to balance sheet assets. 
"Capitalized noninterest income is added to balance sheet assets. 
^Unreported offshore loans are added to balance sheet assets. 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, FDIC, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Table A3 
Additional Off-Balance Sheet Bank-Related Assets* 
Year 
Assets of Nonbank 
Affiliates of Bank 
Holding Companies 
Securitized Consumer 




Sold or Participated-!"** 
1989  224  22  72 
1990  216  40  80 
1991  209  57  65 
1992  212  66  55 
1993  268  83  53 
'Dollar amounts are in billions. 
tOnly loans sold without recourse are included. An unknown but substantial fraction of these loans has been sold to other 
commercial banks. 
"Based on a sample of approximately 60 large commercial banks—not the industry aggregate. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
Tables A4-A6 
U.S. Banking Trends 
Table A4 Sources of Debt of Nonfinancial Corporations Table A5 Bank Performance 
1990  1991  1992  1993*  1990  1991  1992  1993* 
Bonds  37.0%  39.7%  40.8%  41.9%  Return on Assets (%)  .48  .53  .93  1.23 
Mortgages  6.9  6.9  5.9  5.6  Return on Equity (%)  7.45  7.94  13.0  15.7 
Bank Loans  18.3  17.6  16.7  16.2  Bank Loans  18.3  17.6  16.7  16.2 
Number of Problem Institutions  1,012  1,016  787  496 
Other Loans  16.1  13.9  14.0  13.7 
1,012  1,016 
Trade Credit  21.7  21.9  22.5  22.6  Assets of Problem Institutions ($ Bil.)  342  528  408  281 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1993  Source: FDIC 
Table A6 Bank Asset Allocation Ratios 
1990  1991  1992  1993* 
Loans/Assets  61.1  60.2  58.0  57.8 
Commercial Loans/Assets  18.2  17.1  15.5  14.6 
Securities/Assets  17.4  18.6  20.9  22.6 
Asset Growth Rate  2.73  1.21  2.18  4.31 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors and FDIC 
*Ftrst three quarters only. 
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Charts A1-A2 
An Adjusted vs. An Unadjusted Measure of Bank Assets* 
Chart A1 As a Percentage of Financial Intermediary Assets 
Three-Year Moving Averages, 1955-93 
Chart A2 As a Percentage of Nominal Gross Domestic Product 
1957-92 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
'Adjusted bank assets are increased every year in proportion to the ratio of noninterest income to 
net interest income. 
tNIC-1= noninterest income capitalization, method 1. 
Sources: FDIC, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York 
References 
Bacon, Kenneth H. 1993. Losing ground: Banks' declining role in economy worries 
Fed, may hurt firms. Wall Street Journal (July 9): Al. 
Berger, Allen N., and Humphrey, David B. 1992. Measurement and efficiency issues 
in commercial banking. In Output measurement in the service sectors, ed. Zvi 
Griliches, pp. 245-79. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bernanke, Ben S., and Lown, Cara S. 1991. The credit crunch. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2:205-39. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1993. Credit availability for small 
businesses and small farms. 
Boyd, John H., and Gertler, Mark. 1993. U.S. commercial banking: Trends, cycles, and 
policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993: 319-68. 
. 1994. The role of large banks in the recent U.S. banking crisis. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 18 (Winter): 2-21. 
Boyd, John H., and Runkle, David E. 1993. Size and performance of banking firms: 
Testing the predictions of theory. Journal of Monetary Economics 31 (February): 
47-67. 
Cates, David. 1993. The Bank Analyst 7 (no. 3): 1. Ferguson and Company. 
Corrigan, E. Gerald. 1983. Are banks special? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
1992 Annual Report: 5-24. 
D'Arista, Jane W., and Schlesinger, Tom. 1992. The parallel banking system. Manu-
script. Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Ettin, Edward C. 1994. The evolution of the North American banking system. Working 
Paper. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Feldstein, Martin S. 1993. Comment (on Boyd/Gertler paper). NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 1993: 372-76. 
Fixler, Dennis J., and Zieschang, Kimberly D. 1992. User costs, shadow prices, and the 
real output of banks. In Output measurement in the service sectors, ed. Zvi 
Griliches, pp. 219-44. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Furlong, Frederick T. 1991. Can bank capital regulation work? Research revisited. Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review (Summer): 32-33. 
Golembe, Carter H. 1993. Golembe Reports 1993-7: 2-4. 
Johnson, Ronald. 1991. The capital gamble. Manuscript. Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York. 
Lown, Cara S., and Peristiani, Stavros. 1993. The 1990 credit slowdown: Did large 
banks create a credit crunch? Manuscript. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
McCauley, Robert, and Seth, Rama. 1992. Foreign bank credit to U.S. corporations: 
The implications of offshore loans. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quar-
terly Review 17 (Spring): 52-65. 
Nolle, Daniel E. 1994. Are foreign banks out-competing U.S. banks in the U.S. mar-
ket? Working Paper 94-5. U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. 
Peek, Joe, and Rosengren, Eric. 1991. The capital crunch: Neither a borrower nor a 
lender be. Working Paper 91-4. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
Romer, Christina D., and Romer, David H. 1993. Credit channel or credit actions: An 
interpretation of the postwar transmission mechanism. In Changing capital mar-
kets: Implications for monetary policy, pp. 71-116. Kansas City: Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City. 
Terrell, Henry S. 1993. U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks: A new look. Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin 79 (October): 913-25. 
23 